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ABSTRACT
It has been a commonplace that the idea of pro­
gress grew out of the scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth century. In fact, pre-scientific inti^ 
mations of this idea can be found among humanists 
and reformers in sixteenth-century England. Desi- 
derius Erasmus and Thomas More had a vague conception 
of man's potential for perfectibility, but they saw 
in history only decline and degeneracy. Juan Luis 
Vives and Thomas Starkey both posited a theory of 
man's rise from primitive savagery to civilized 
society, "by little and little." They believed in 
man's educability, and that through individual per­
fection society can attain perfection. For Starkey 
in particular, the mutability of human law and its 
potential for improvement was integral to his con­
ception of progress, a belief shared by Richard Hooker
To a much lesser extent, the concept that meaning 
ful development and change are a possibility can be 
found in the apologetics of the ecclesiastics charged 
with the defense of the Via Media, especially in the 
work of John Whitgift. Early Protestants held to 
an ecclesiastical version of history as a decline 
from a golden age. Whitgift, in defending church 
institutions, argued that there was room for change 
and growth, for development in the church. It is in 
the work of Richard Hooker that the thought of Vives 
and Starkey is combined with that of Whitgift, and 
it is in his work that is found the fullest expression 
of the idea of progress in sixteenth-century England.
"BY LITTLE AND LITTLE:"
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
INTRODUCTION
The sixteenth century was an age of intellectual 
ferment during which were born ideas that would de­
cisively shape the form of modern Europe. Among them 
was the idea of progress which, while it did not fully 
emerge for nearly two hundred years, had its genesis 
in a group of related ideas that entered the dialogue 
of learned men at this time. It has in the past been 
generally agreed that the modern formulation of 
the idea of progress had its origin in the seventeenth 
century with the rise of science, Subsequently, the 
concept became so entwined with science that most 
thinking concerning the origins of the idea became 
colored by scientific considerations to the exclusion 
of other sources. It has been remarked that "most 
students of the idea of progress point to modern science 
as the enterprise which did most to achieve the as­
cendancy and unfold the meaning of human progress," 
and this led them to predetermine "who would play the 
hero in their writing, and how the hero would sweep 
to victory along a unilinear path of development, 
before they ever set pen to p a p e r . S i n c e  the wed­
ding of Progress to Evolution in the nineteenth cen­
tury, it has become impossible to speak of the former 
apart from science, and in fact the idea of progress
2.
3.
has itself become something of a scientific proposition.
Not all the sources of the idea of progress were 
in science, though, nor are all to be found in his­
toriography, despite the fact that the idea is an 
explanation of the human past. This is certainly not 
to say that these two, history and science, are of 
no importance to the origin of progress, but there was 
in the sixteenth century speculation tending towards 
the idea of progress apart from them.
Progress, as the term shall henceforth be used, 
is "the idea. . .that mankind has advanced in the 
past--from some aboriginal condition of primitiveness, 
barbarism, or even nullity^--is now advancing, and will 
continue to advance through the forseeable future.
While the notion was rarely, if ever, stated in terms 
as explicit as this, the concept does encompass several 
components which can be found in literature of this 
time. There is the notion of the perfectibility of 
man through education, the idea that with proper training 
man can realize his potential. Allied with this is a 
belief in a "slow, gradual, and cumulative improvement 
in knowledge." Also a part of the idea of progress 
is the belief that society has risen to a higher level 
of civilization from its primitive beginnings. Finally, 
there are the related notions that human law is subject 
to change and improvement and that institutions are 
likewise subject to the same change and improvement. 
Common to all of these is the notion of gradualness,
4.
that things unfold over an extended period of time, 
and the notion of linear continuity. All of these 
together embody the idea of progress.
In the work of Richard Hooker (1554-1600), per­
haps the finest mind produced by England in the six­
teenth century, can be found these elements of the 
idea of progress. In his Of the Lawes of Ecclesias­
tical! Polity (Books I-IV, 1593; Book V, 1597), is 
the fullest and most nearly explicit expression of 
the idea of progress as it had developed to that time, 
and coming as he did at century’s end, his work was 
the summation of a stream of thought that had begun 
in the Henrician era with Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) 
and Thomas Starkey (c. 1495^-1538) and in the work 
of the apologists for the Via Media, especially John 
Whitgift (1530^-1603) . While it is an idea intimately 
related to history, in England it was developed not 
so much by historians as by humanists concerned with 
education and society and given its fullest expression 
by a theologian charged with the defense of the estab­
lished church.
CHAPTER I
ENGLISH HUMANISM AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
The humanist attitude towards education embodied 
a belief in the educability of man, a belief that 
environment played a significant role in the shaping 
of a man's mind, and a belief that nothing in man 
was so rooted that it could not be corrected through 
education. Coupled with these beliefs was the idea 
that man's rational nature allowed him to shape, by 
education, his environment. What was a significant 
factor, though, one which separated the sixteenth- 
century humanist from the eighteenth-century philo- 
sophe was the unwillingness of the former to jettison 
Christian beliefs, which proved to be an obstacle 
to the latter when the modern idea of progress was 
formulated.^ While the amelioration of the human con­
dition was considered possible, it was not viewed 
as either continuous or even necessary. How man 
used the gifts with which he was endowed determined
his progress, and to most the history of man in this
. . 2regard provided little encouragement to optimism.
European humanists as a whole looked to education 
as the key to m a n ’s improvement, relying on the notion
5.
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of man as fundamentally a rational being.^ The belief 
was that men had three distinctions that set them 
apart from animals. Man has within his nature implanted 
the virtue of driving towards perfection. Where ani­
mals have instincts, man has reason which allows him 
to reach for perfection. Finally, man has a need for 
gathering into society with other humans.  ^ Taken 
together, these concepts provided a seedbed for the 
growth of an optimistic view concerning m a n ’s ascent 
to civilization.
Any discussion of humanism in England must include Desi- 
derius Erasmus (c. 1466-1535) and Thomas More (1475-1535) 
even though neither can really be considered a proponent 
of the idea of progress in any more than a half-hearted 
way. Certainly, in the works of Erasmus one can find 
much that appears to presage the idea of progress.
With the majority of humanists Erasmus believed in the 
educability of man, and that man could through education 
be improved. Men were, he felt, moulded by education 
not birth--’’homines non nascuntur, sed finguntur,1 ^
Heredity does not play a role, nor natural differences 
that occur between men. Any disparity that exists 
can be overcome through the agency of education, an 
agency to which he attributes much power. It is through 
the ratio in man that Erasmus believes education to 
find its power, and once man has received the proper 
education, the enlightened reason will become his guiding
7.
principle and will allow him to attain perfection 
through it.^ Through nature, training, and practice, 
man can achieve individual progress.
By Nature, I mean partly innate capacity 
for being trained, partly native bent to­
wards excellence. By Training, I mean the 
skilled application of instruction and 
guidance. By Practice, the free exercise 
on our own part of that activity which has 
been implanted by and is furthered by 
Training. Nature without skilled training 
must be imperfect, and Practice without 
the method which Training supplies leads 
to hopeless confusion.^
Erasmus felt that God endowed all men with free will, 
and thus there is no ingrained badness within man 
that cannot be corrected by reason. He laid on Christian 
society the responsibility to instruct all members
o
to attain perfection through education and reason.
Yet Erasmus did not find that there was any real 
progress in human history— he only believed that indi­
vidual progress was a possibility, through man's 
potential for improvement through education, 
a belief he held in common with Thomas More. As with 
Erasmus, much that More wrote indicated at least a 
belief in the possibility of individual progress, and 
he allowed that social progress was theoretically 
possible. In his most famous work, Utopia (1516), More de­
scribes how Utopus chose not to institute a perfect 
state, but left it incomplete so that things could
develop through the course of time.
They say that in the beginning the whole 
city was planned by King Utopus himself, but 
that he left to posterity matters of adorn­
ment and improvement, such as could not be 
perfected in one man's l i f e t i m e . ^
Utopians were open to history and found that it pro­
vided various revelations. Through it they saw the 
potential for scientific development, and they believed 
history was also the revealer of the nature of truth, 
which they felt comes forth by its own strength through 
time."*-^  More shows in Utopia "that the tribulatory 
imperfection of human nature itself similarly induces-- 
or should induce^— creative effort, social as well as 
individual, to mitigate its effects." History, to 
Utopians, "shows what might be achieved, in the context 
of what cannot.
More seemed to attack those of his contemporaries 
who stubbornly held to received customs rather than 
accept change that would lead to progress. In response 
to More's suggestion that he could do immense good 
as a public servant, Hythloday responds negatively.
Now in a court composed of people who envy 
everyone else and admire only themselves, 
if a man should suggest something he had 
read of in other ages or seen in other 
places, the other counsellors would think 
their reputation for wisdom was endangeredf 
and they would look like simpletons, unless
9.
they could find fault with his proposal.
If all else failed, they would take refuge 
in some remark like this: 'The way we're
doing it is the way we've always done it, 
this custom was good enough for our fathers, 
and I hope we're as wise as they were.'
And with this deep thought they would take 
their seats, as though they had said the 
last word on the subject— implying, forsooth, 
that it would be a very dangerous matter 
if a man were found to be wiser in any point 
than his forefathers were. As a matter 
of fact, we quietly neglect the best exam­
ples they have left us; but if something 
better is proposed, we seize the excuse 
of reverence for times past and cling to 
it desperately.12
More even cautiously suggests that the accomplishments 
of his own age and nation are not to be despised, 
using Peter Giles as his mouthpiece.
'You will have a hard time persuading me' 
said Peter Giles, 'that people in that 
new land are better governed than in the 
world we know. Our minds are not inferior 
to theirs, and our government, I believe, 
is older. Long experience has helped us 
develop many conveniences of life, and by 
good luck we have discovered many other 
things which human ingenuity could never 
hit on, 3
Nevertheless, More had little faith in progress 
as a fact. His Augustinianism never allowed him to 
believe that history would ever lead to the world 
that was the dream of humanist philosophers. His 
History of King Richard III (c. 1514) shows history to be a 
dramatic continuum where perfection cannot be attained 
by men, yet they must strive for it or be engulfed by
10.
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evil. J The world was in no way perfectible because 
of the eternal conflict between good and evil within 
human nature.^ More concluded from biblical history 
that man's condition was ever the same despite changing 
circumstances.^ In the end, More saw Providence, not 
Progress, as the moving force in history. Man's nature 
of itself leads to degeneration, but God's Providence 
has throughout history prevented chaos from becoming 
complete. More found in history a basic rhythm of
1 o
decline and then providential renewal. ° More's view 
of history and the possibilities of progress thus 
changed little from the time he composed an epigram 
dedicated to Henry VIII.
Plato foretold that everything which any 
particular time can produce had often existed 
and would often sometime in the future exist 
again. 'As spring is banished and returns 
with the swift passage of the year, as 
familiar winter after an unchanging interval 
returns, just so,' he said, 'after many 
revolutions of the speeding sky all things 
in their countless turn will be again.'
The golden age came first, then the silver; 
after that the bronze, and recently the 
iron age. In your reign, Sire, the golden 
age has returned. May Plato be to this 
extent a true prophet,
Though the most brilliant of luminaries, Erasmus 
and More were not, however, the sum of humanism in 
Renaissance England. The idea of progress could be 
found in a considerably stronger form in the work of 
two of the lesser humanists of this generation, Juan
11.
Luis Vives and Thomas Starkey.
Though not as well known as Erasmus, Vives was
one of the most important itinerant humanists to
reside in England in this period. His chief interest
was education, and it was as a lecturer in Rhetoric
? nthat he was brought by Cardinal Wolsey to Oxford.
In the words of one of his modern editors, Vives "was 
the Quintillian of the Renascence, in looking for­
ward towards the conceptions of the golden age placed 
in the future, not in the past; towards scientific 
knowledge gained, not from time-honored but obsolete 
authority, such as that of Aristotle and the scholas­
tic philosophers, but from independent research and 
the direct interrogation of nature; and finally in 
looking forward to the rise and growth of separate 
nationalities and separate v e r n a c u l a r s . I n  this 
way he stands in contrast with Erasmus and More; he 
displays in his writings a distinct sympathy for 
notions that tend towards the idea of progress. He 
had no place for the commonly held belief that nature, 
as all organisms, was in a state of decay and senescence 
and that such was i n e v i t a b l e . 22 He was conscious of the 
present and of its possibilities for future development, 
and we find him on "the side of the moderns against the 
ancients. . . ,"23
The idea of progress is strongly evident in Vives1 
On the Corruption of the Arts (1531). In his
12.
introduction he dispenses with the long held belief 
that everything should be taken on authority, not 
on independent discovery. He did not stand overawed 
by the ancients, for he believed "they were men as 
we are, and were liable to be deceived and to err." 
Vives maintained that "they were the first discoverers 
of what were only, as it were, rough and, if I may 
say so, shapeless blocks which they passed on to their 
posterity to be purified and put into shape." He asks 
rhetorically "would they not be themselves unwilling 
to pledge us not to use our own intellects in seeking 
to pass beyond their gifts to us." Vives insisted 
that the ancients would applaud the efforts of later 
men to surpass their own accomplishments.
The good men amongst them undoubtedly in the 
past stretched forth their hands in friend­
ship to those whom they saw mounting higher 
in knowledge than they themselves had reached. 
For they judged it to be of the very essence 
of the human race, that, daily, it should 
progress in the arts, disciplines, virtue 
and goodness. We think ourselves men or 
even less, whilst we regard them as more 
than men, as heroes, or perhaps demi-gods-- 
not but what they excelled in many and great 
achievements.
Strong words to be written by a man of the Renaissance, 
the age when humanists revered the ancients as the 
Reformers revered the early Church. He goes on to 
equate his age with all previous:
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So we also might no less excel in the eyes 
of our posterity, if we were to strive 
sufficiently earnestly, or we might achieve 
still more, since we have the advantage 
of what they discovered in knowledge as 
our basis, and can make the addition to it 
of what our judgment finds out.
Vives then turns and attacks a famous and time-honored 
aphorism:
For it is a false and fond similitude, which
some writers adopt, though they think it
witty and suitable, that we are, compared
with the ancients, as dwarfs upon the shoulders
of giants. It is not so. Neither are we
dwarfs, nor they giants, but we are all of one
stature, save that we are lifted up somewhat
higher by their means, provided that there
be found in us the same studiousness, watch-
9 4fulness and love of truth, as was in them.
The ideas expressed in these passages are remarkable 
and they are not singular, for they reappear again in 
another of Vives' works, On Education (1531). He 
insists that his era was on the threshhold of advance­
ment, of which this would be but the most recent mani­
festation .
Nature is not yet so effete and exhausted 
as to be unable to bring forth, in our 
times, results comparable to those of 
earlier ages. She always remains equal to 
herself, and not rarely she comes forward 
more strongly and powerful than in the past, 
as if mustering together all her forces.
So we must regard her in this present age, 
as re-enforced by the confirmed strength 
which has developed, by degrees, through 
so many centuries.
14.
He again turns his criticism to those who maintain 
that men can at best only emulate their predecessors, 
nor surpass them:
For how greatly do the discoveries of earlier 
ages and experiences spread over long 
stretches of time, open up the entrance 
to the comprehension of the different bran­
ches of knowledge? It is therefore clear 
that, if we only apply our minds suf­
ficiently, we can judge better over the 
whole round of life and nature than could 
Aristotle, Plato, or any of the ancients, 
who spent their energies in so prolonged 
an observation of the greatest and hidden 
things, as to bring forth in them rather 
the wondrous admiration of newness than 
fresh contributions to real knowledge.
Vives repeats his assertion that the ancients would 
themselves do what he urged his contemporaries to do:
Furtherf what was the method of Aristotle 
himself? Did he not dare to pluck up by 
the root the received opinions of his prede­
cessors? Is it, then, to be forbidden to 
us to at least investigate, and to form 
our own opinions? Especially as Seneca 
wisely declares: 'Those who have been active
intellectually before us, are not Our mas­
ters but our leaders.' Truth stands open 
to all. It is not as yet taken possession 
of. Much of truth has been left for future 
generations to discover.25
As with all humanists, Vives set great store by 
man's ability to reason, as indicated in the opening 
line of On Education: "Man has received from God a
great gift, viz. a mind, and the power of inquiring 
into things; with which power he can behold not only
15.
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the present, but also cast his gaze over the past 
and the f u t u r e . "^6 Vives describes in the first chap­
ter of On Education how human society gradually arose 
from man's at first solitary existence through the 
use of reason. Man first needed sustenance, which 
led to distinguishing between good and bad food; then 
clothing, followed shortly by shelter, first flimsy 
structures and then caves. At this point men banded 
together, only to split into family units which then 
left the cave to construct huts. At first widely 
scattered, these huts came to be built in groups, vil­
lages, Government now appeared of necessity, for 
human society came into being. Laws followed closely, 
then walls around the settlement and weapons for 
defense.^7 His point is that man is a social and 
rational being, and that this type of progression is 
therefore likely to continue.
Vives is not the complete optimist, however, and 
readily admits that while there has been progress 
it has not been uniform;
Nevertheless, man has wandered further out 
of the way than he has advanced in the way. 
If anyone looks at the steps he has ac­
complished and the results at which he has 
arrived, by themselves, they seem quite 
marvellous. If he compares them with what 
has yet to be attained, he must conclude 
that man has scarcely put his foot beyond 
the threshold, so few and so obscure are 
those facts which he p o s s e s s e s . 28
16.
Vives clearly allows for almost limitless improvement, 
not only as desirable, but as possible. Knowledge 
is the key, and knowledge is cumulative:
In the beginning first one, then another 
experience through wonder at its novelty, 
was noted down for use in life; from a number 
of separate experiments the mind gathered 
a universal law, which, after it was fur­
ther supported and confirmed by many experi­
ments, was considered certain, and estab­
lished. Then it was handed down to pos­
terity. Other men added subject matter 
which tended to the same use and end. This 
material, collected by men of great and 
distinguished intellect, constituted the 
branches of knowledge, or the a r t s . ^ 9
While Vives believed human perfectibility was 
possible, he did not separate it from religion and 
man's indebtedness to God:
, , .the human mind, provided with its
small lamp, is not able to attain to the 
conception of that ultimate end, unless it 
has been enlightened by the end itself. . .
therefore there was need of God, not only 
to teach us how to come to Him, but also 
to lead us by the hand, since we are weak, 
and constantly liable to fall. . . . Piety
is,'of all things, the most necessary for 
perfecting m a n , ™
In the work of Vives we find thus one of the 
earliest expressions of the idea of progress, remarkable 
for the time in which he wrote. It is all the more re­
markable that historians of the idea have paid him 
so little notice. Vives is one of the first humanists
17.
to have broken free of the cyclical explanation of 
the human past. He, like Erasmus, was in many ways 
a man out of his time. As one writer has observed,
"in all these things— his questioning of authority, 
use of the inductive method, insistence on the re­
lation of knowledge to human welfare, support for 
vernacular tongues--Vives points the way to the 
empirical materialist philosophy of the seventeenth 
century and the activities of those who founded the 
first scientific s o c i e t i e s J ---and to the men who 
formulated the idea of progress.
Vives was a Spaniard, Erasmus a Dutchman, Though 
both foreigners, they exerted a tremendous influence 
upon English thought. Aside from Thomas More, the 
other English humanist whose thought has any signifi­
cant bearing on the early history of the idea of pro­
gress was Thomas Starkey, a protege of Thomas Cromwell. 
Starkey's works were never widely circulated, and 
his most famous work, A Dialogue between Reginald 
Pole and Thomas Lupset, remained unpublished until 
1871, There is considerable doubt as to the details 
of composition and circulation of this work as they 
were presented by his earlier interpreters, though 
it appears to have been completed in either 1531 
or 1532.32
The idea of progress is as strongly evident in 
Starkey's work as in Vives1. Interestingly, Aristotle
18.
appears to be a strong determinant in their thought, as 
opposed to Plato, who influenced both More and Erasmus 
to a great degree. In "What ys pollycy aftur the 
setece of Arystotyl," Starkey describes how man once 
"waueryd abrode in the wyld feldys & woodys" as ani­
mals, until such time as men of wisdom led them to 
abandon their brute existence and build towns and 
establish laws. From this came different types of 
policy which were acceptable "in dyverse natyonys & 
cutreys accordying to the dyuersyte of the nature 
of the pepul in euy comynalty." He defined policy as 
"but a certayn ordur, gounace, & rule, wher by the 
multytude & the hole comynalty in euy cutrey cyte & 
towne, whether they be gounyd by a pryce or comyn 
coseyl ys euer dyrectyd, formyd, & inducyd to the 
ryght trade of vertue & honestye."^ The similarity 
to what Vives wrote is obvious. The concept of the 
relativity of law is the key to Starkey’s thought:
"yet to thys law or that law, al men are not bounden, 
but only such as receyue them, and be vnder the domynyon 
of them, wych haue authoryte of maykyng therof." In 
the case of particular ecclesiastical customs governing 
priestly celibacy, eating fish on Friday, etc., these 
are laws only of custom. "And thus in infynyte other 
hyt ys euydent to se, how that to be obedyent to the 
lawys in euery cuntrey hyt ys a certayn vertue, but 
of that sort wych hath hys strength and powar holly of
19.
the opynyon and consent of man.
The idea of progress is most evident in the Dialogue. 
He posits that individual as well as societal per­
fection lies in the rule of law.
For hither tendeth all prudence and policy; 
to bring the whole country to quietness 
and civility, that every man, and so the 
whole, may at the last attain to such per­
fection as by nature is to the dignity of 
man due, which as it seemeth resteth in 
the communing, of all such virtues as to 
the dignity of man are convenient, to the 
profit of other, living together in civil 
life and politic; yea, and, as it were, 
in the forming of other to their natural 
perfection. For like as the body of man 
is then most perfect in his nature when 
it hath power to gender another like there­
unto, so is the mind most perfect when it 
communeth and spreadeth his virtues abroad 
to the instruction of the other. Then it 
is most like unto the nature of God, Whose 
infinite virtue is therein most perceived, 
that he Communeth His goodness to all 
creatures: to some more, to some less,• o  c r
according to their nature and dignity. 3
Starkey is so confident in the self-revident fact of 
man's progress from primitivism that he brings forth 
the argument for a decline from a golden age, which 
he puts in the mouth of Reginald Pole:
You said last of all that man is born, and 
of nature brought forth, to a civility, and 
to live in politic order - the which thing 
to me seemeth clean contrary. For if you 
call this civility and living in politic 
order, a commanalty to live under a prince 
or a common counsel in cities and towns, 
meseemeth man should not be born thereto, 
forasmuch as man at the beginning lived many 
years without any such polity; at the which
20.
time he lived more virtuously and more 
according to the dignity of his nature 
than he doth now in this which you call 
politic order and civility. . . .
Pole concludes by asserting that man in his natural 
state is at his happiest:
Therefore if this be civil life and order - 
to live in cities and towns with so much vice 
and misorder - meseem man should not be 
born therto, but rather to life in the wild 
forest, there more following the study of 
virtue, as it is said men did in the golden 
age wherein man lived according to his 
natural dignity.36
Lupset responds by defending law and civil polity, 
civilization as it had developed and progressed, as 
a good thing. It is rather in man that evil and short­
coming is to be found:
But this I call the civil life, contrary; 
living togidder in good and politic order, 
one ever ready to do good to another, and 
as it were conspiring togidder in all vir­
tue and honesty. This is very true and 
civil life; and though it be so that man 
abuseth the society and company of man 
in cities and towns, giving himself to 
all vice, yet we may not therefore cast 
down cities and towns and drive man to 
the woods again and wild forests wherein 
he lived at the first beginning, rudely. 
The fault whereof is nother in the cities 
nor towns, nother in the laws ordained 
therto, but is in the malice of man, which 
abuseth and turneth that thing which might
be to his wealth and felicity to his own
• 7 7destruction and misery.-3 '
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This allowance made for, Starkey lauds (through Lupset) 
the accomplishments men in society with each other 
have wrought, the progress that has been made.
And furthermore, plainly this thing to see, 
let us, as it were, out of a higher place 
behold and consider the wonderful works 
of man here upon earth, where first we shall 
see the goodly cities, castles and towns build 
for the setting forth of the politic life, 
pleasantly set as they were the stars upon 
earth, wherein we shall see also marvellous 
good laws, statutes and ordinances devised 
by man by high policy for the maintaining 
of the civil life. We shall see infinite 
strange arts and crafts, invented by m a n ’s 
wit for his commodity, some for pleasure 
and some for necessity. Further, we shall 
see how by his labour and diligence he hath 
tilled the earth and brought forth infinite 
fruits for his necessary food and pleasant 
sustenance, so that now the earth (which 
else should have lain like a forest rude 
and untilled) by the diligent labour and 
policy of man is brought to marvellous 
culture and fertility.
Good humanist that he is, it is to reason that Starkey 
attributes man's first rise from his primitive state, 
reason which man has received from his Creator, giving 
him a portion of divinity.
Thus, if we with ourself reason and consider 
the works of man here upon earth, we shall 
nothing doubt of his excellent dignity, but 
plainly affirm that he hath in him a sparkle 
of divinity, and is surely of a celestial 
and divine nature, seeing that by memory 
and wit also he conceiveth the nature of 
all things. For there is nothing here in 
this world, nother in heaven above, nor in 
earth beneath, but he by his reason compre- 
hendeth it. So that I think we may conclude
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that man by nature in excellence and dig­
nity even so excelleth all other creatures 
here upon earth as God exceedeth the nature
of man.39
Starkey maintained "that these virtues stand not in 
the opinion of man, but by the benefit and power of 
nature in his heart are rooted and planted, inclining 
him to the civil life, according to the excellent 
dignity of his n a t u r e . H o w e v e r  much these virtues 
are ingrained in the character of man, his progress 
is not a foregone conclusion, "But here we must note 
that, like as in many things which by experience we 
daily see, nature requireth the diligence of man, 
leaving them unperfit of themself, as the seeds and 
fruits of the ground, which she will never bring to 
perfection, if man withhold his diligence and labour; 
so in these virtues and law of nature, she requireth 
the aid and diligence of man, which else will soon be 
oppressed and corrupt." This progression to perfection 
is provisional and fragile: "There be in man's life 
so many occasions of destroying these seeds and virtues, 
plants and laws, that except there be joined some good 
provision for their springing up and good culture, 
they shall never bring forth their fruit, they shall 
never bring man to his perfection."
What maintains the social progress that has been 
attained and allows for further growth are laws and 
customs.
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Wherefore among all men and all nations, 
as I think, upon earth there be and ever 
hath been other certain customs and manners 
by long use and time confirmed and approved, 
other laws, written and devised by the 
politic wit of man, received and stablished 
for the maintenance and setting forward 
of these natural seeds and plants of virtue; 
which custom and law, by man so ordained 
and devised, is called the civil law, for-*- 
because they be as means to bring man to 
perfection of the civil life. Without the 
ordinance of these laws, the other soon will 
be corrupt, the weeds will soon overgrow 
the good corn.
Such civil laws are both mutable and relative, varying 
according to particular human circumstances.
This law civil is far different from the 
other, for in every country it is diverse 
and variable, yea almost in every city and 
town. This law taketh effect of the 
opinion of man; it resteth wholly in his 
consent, and varieth according to the place 
and time, insomuch that in diverse time 
and place contrary laws are both good and 
both convenient to the politic life.
Against this mutable law, Starkey set the immutable, 
unchanging law of nature, upon which all other law is 
grounded.
Whereas the law of nature is ever one, in 
all countries, firm and stable, and never 
for the time varieth; it is never change­
able; the consent of man doth nothing there­
to; it hangeth nothing of time nor place, 
but according as right reason is ever one, 
so is this law, and never varieth after 
the fancy of man. This law is the ground 
and end of the other, to the which it must 
ever be referred, noe otherwise than the
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conclusions of arts mathematical are ever 
referred to their principles. For civil 
ordinance is but as a mean to bring man 
to observe this law of nature, insomuch 
that if there be any civil law ordained 
which cannot be resolved thereto, it is of 
no value. For all good civil laws spring 
and issue out of the law of nature, as 
brooks and rivers out of fountains and wells; 
and to that all must be resolved and re­
ferred as to the end why they be ordained,
to the observation whereof they are but as 
42means.
At the outset of the dialogue, as we have seen, 
Starkey had Pole voicing the opinion that man was 
best in his natural state in a golden age. By the 
latter part of the dialogue, Pole has come fully to 
accept Lupset's position.
A time there was, Master Lupset, as we find 
in stories many and diverse, when man, with­
out city or town, law of religion, wandered 
abroad in the wild fields and woods none 
other wise than you see now brute beasts 
to do.
No longer does Pole opine that man should live "in 
the wild forest, there more following the study of
■k
virtue, as it is said men did in the golden age. . . . "  
It was through the agency of reason that man advanced, 
and until such time he remained in this primitive 
state.
At the which time he was led and drawn 
without reason and rule by frail fantasy 
and inordinate affects, and so long con­
*
See above page 20.
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tinued and many years, till at the last 
certain men of great wit and policy, with 
perfit eloquence and high philosophy, con­
sidering the excellent nature and dignity 
of man, and perceiving right well that he 
was born and of nature brought forth to 
higher perfection than he applied himself 
unto, began to persuade the rest of the people 
to forsake that rudeness and uncomely life, 
and so to follow some order and civility.
Starkey, through Pole, then describes the rise of 
urban civilization in terms that bear a striking 
resemblance to those used by Vives.
And first of all to build them certain 
cities and towns wereto they might as­
semble to their common aid, succour and 
commodity, avoiding the danger and peril 
of the wild beasts, by whom they were oft 
before devoured and destroyed. Then, after 
they devised certain ordinance and laws 
whereby they might be somewhat induced to 
follow a life convenient to their nature 
and dignity.
What follows is among the strongest indications of the 
idea of progress in his work:
These laws and ordinance, at the first 
beginning, also were unperfit and somewhat 
rude, according to the time and nature of 
the people; for it was not possible sudden­
ly by exact law and policy to bring such 
a rude multitude to perfit civility, but 
ever as the people by process of time in 
virtue increased, so particular laws by 
politic men were devised. And thus in 
long time, by perfit eloquence and high 
philosophy, men were brought by little and 
little from the rude life in fields and 
woods to this civility which you now see 
stablished and set in all well-ruled cities 
and towns.^
While the idea of progress is yet 200 years in 
the future, one can certainly see here a bold step 
towards it and away from the idea of the Golden Age 
as something in the distant, mythological past, not 
something yet to be attained. Both Starkey and Vives 
saw their age as one not to be despised, but as one 
equal to those of antiquity. The concept that society 
undergoes slow gradual change to meet new circumstances 
was important to both, and both can be seen to allow 
that a progress of man from a primitive state of 
nature to yet a more advanced level of society was 
a positive development. It remained for Richard Hooker 
at the century's end to give final formulation to the 
idea of progress of the sixteenth-century, drawing 
upon the work of Vives and Starkey but also upon the 
tradition of the defense of the Via Media as worked 
out by the apologists of the established church be­
tween 1520 and 1580.
CHAPTER II
THE VIA MEDIA AND THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT
The Reformation was an intensely historicist 
period wherein the protagonists made extensive use 
of the past for polemical purposes. For the English 
Reformation this was particularly the case due to 
the peculiarities of reform in Britain. As is well 
known, her Reformation began haltingly in doctrinal 
matters though quite calamitously in regards to her 
relationship with Rome, and it was not until Edward 
V i ’s reign that Protestants could contest openly for 
their vision of the Church reformed. The manner in 
which events unfolded left England with a church 
government essentially unchanged (excepting the 
displacement of Pope by King and the dissolution 
of the monasteries, in themselves a sharp break with 
the past ) r but with a Protestant doctrine in a state 
of flux. Apologists for what would become the Estab­
lished Church were forced by circumstance to defend 
the episcopate and the existing church government as 
legitimate developments, using as a guiding principle 
the adiaphoristic doctrine. Their sense of historical
27.
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change would become sharpened by the challenge posed 
from the more radically Protestant of Englishmen.
It is among the advocates of the Via Media that we 
find expressions of the idea of progress.
As already noted, one of the ways in which the 
English Reformation differed from that on the Conti­
nent was that it was begun by the state and then taken 
further by the Reformers, and that it was enforced 
through law. English law was (and is) based on pre­
cedents and is thus to some extent historical. For 
the Reformation, though, precedents were hard to find, 
and. justification of it was taken from history (as 
in the preface to the Act in Restraint of Appeals), or 
alternatively from political theory, itself drawn in 
part from historical appeals,^ The Henrician refor­
mation was successful in no small part because of its 
"appeal to history and the maintenance of the tra- 
ditional faith and practice of Catholicism." As 
time passed, the continuity with Catholicism (at least 
in its Roman form) became weaker, but in appealing 
to the first five centuries of the Church's history 
defenders of the Via Media were able to rebut the 
charge of innovation with a claim to be engaged in 
renovation, calling for support from the same authori- 
ties used by their Roman Catholic opponents. In 
establishing the royal supremacy there was of necessity 
change, but in defending it as legitimate its apolo­
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gists made "an honest effort. . .to join the past 
and the living present."^ The church was recognized 
"as a corporation, human in origin and character, 
a society capable of change in its ideas and prac­
tices as its conditions of temporal existence changed, 
its experience susceptible of analysis in the shifting 
and relativistic terms of period and process.
Yet for all the concern with history, one finds 
little that points to the idea of progress, much less 
gives expression to it, before John Whitgift. Not 
all Protestants shared the sense of positive growth 
and development in the Church's past, and it was not 
until John Jewel and John Whitgift that it became 
common. William Tyndale(c, 1495-1536) used history, 
but that his writing turned historical on occasion 
was purely coincidental, as he viewed history much 
the same way Luther did: useful when denouncing, but 
not a way of proving truths.^ He viewed the history 
of the Church after the Apostles as one of the de­
cline of a once pristine institution, but since it 
was outside the scope of the New Testament he felt 
it could be subjected to historical scrutiny. But 
one never encounters much interest on his part with 
speculation on growth and development in the Church-- 
not surprising, since his concern was the restoration 
of the Apostolic Church. To admit development would 
be to give ground to the Roman Catholics, particularly
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his chief antagonist Thomas More. Tyndale was fol­
lowed in the same way by Robert Barnes and John Bale, 
two other early Protestants who made use of history.
Barnes (c. 1495-1540) intended in his work to demonstrate 
through a narrative of the growth of the Papacy's temporal 
power how the clergy were always subversive to royal 
government.^ His Vitae Romanorum pontificum (1536) was an 
attempt to show how numerous practices in the Roman 
Church could not be found in the Apostolic Church 
and were thus anachronistic. Whatever his intentions, 
he did not fulfill the promise that his work held.
As has been pointed out, "the text was tenditious, 
the marginal notes vitriolic," and he did not go 
into great detail, for "Barnes did not intend to 
write a full history of the church." This, combined 
with his "totally uncritical use of sources" leaves 
"only one conclusion. , .possible: Barnes was simply 
no historian."^
John B a l e (1495-1563) was certainly the better historian 
of the t h r e e , y e t  he too followed Tyndale1s inter­
pretation of the Church's past. In Bale's work was 
sounded the Protestant version of a decline from a 
golden age: "In the prymatyve churche was the gos- 
pell gredylye recyved of the unyversall worlde, in 
the myddes thereof whan Sathan was at lyberte, was 
yt in a maner conttempned of all menne, and hypocresye 
taken up in the stede thereof. Now in the latter 
ende are menne agayne verye desyrouse of y t . . . .
31.
In The Image of bothe churches (1545-6), Bale intended 
to demonstrate that the Church fell from its early 
purity, though God kept a faithful few true to him.
In this regard, his approach had a marked similarity 
to that of Thomas More's. Bale used Revelation as 
his guide, following Francis Lambert's work on that 
book closely, supplying a wealth of detail lacking
1 o
in the Marburg reformer's work. Revelation, in 
Bale's work, if interpreted correctly in correlation 
with the history of the Church showed a decline, slow 
but increasing, until a reaction took place. Per-
1 o
fection existed only at the beginning.
Yet while Bale never fully adopted a develop­
mental position as regards the church's past, he did 
not remain a rigid biblicist. Sola Scriptura was a 
major principle in Bale's armory of weapons polemical 
for use against the Roman Church, especially when 
attacking the excrescences of late medieval piety, 
but against radicals carrying Sola Scriptura to an 
extreme, Bale had to extend the time frame of the pure 
church beyond the Apostolic period. Enter the use 
of periodization against the radicals, and his charac­
terization of the English church to 597 as a golden 
era. By the publication of the Summararium (1548) , 
he used the argument that no doctrine was valid except 
it be held "among doctors of the early Church,
Bale had thus moved closer to the position of Cranmer,
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Ridley and Jewel.
The last major historian-polemicist, John Foxe(1517-87), 
followed Bale. His Acts and Monuments (1563) was 
a history of two churches. On the one hand, he 
chronicled the false, or Roman, church in its sordid 
decline and contrasted it with the survival of the 
true church on the other hand, He used a periodi­
zation of church history, each section of which was 
about three hundred years. The first three hundred 
were those of purity and persecution; the second a 
period of quiet, ending with the rise of pope, monks, 
and the Infidel. The unmitigated decline went with­
out serious challenge until Wyclif,but with him fol­
lowed persecution once he uncovered the falsehoods 
of Rome. With Luther came the final blows that would 
hopefully topple the Papacy. In all, Foxe used the 
Apocalypse of St. John as his guide, and believed 
firmly in the divine planning of all history.^
Thus all four-.r-Tyndale, Barnes, Bale and Foxe-^ 
while making heavy use of history in their polemics 
did not find a pattern of development and growth in 
the past. They repeated in religious form the Renais­
sance view of history as a decline from a golden past 
into decadence, with renewal only coming within their 
lifetime. For them, history was leading somewhere, 
and that somewhere was the Second Coming. In a later 
age this would be translated into a species of the idea
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of progress,^ but for now it was in the work of 
the defenders of the Via Media that the ideas of pro­
gress were to be found.
The ecclesiastics charged with the defense of 
the established church found in the adiaphoristic 
principle one of their most useful weapons, first 
against their Roman Catholic opponents and later against 
the extreme Protestants. Simply put, adiaphora were 
things indifferent to salvation primarily, but also 
to church government. Moderate Protestants felt that 
if Scripture did not forbid something, then it was a 
matter of indifference. Such a principle left the 
way open for development both in church doctrine and 
government, which was just the point the Anglicans 
were trying to make, No one in the controversy in­
tended that the English church be forced into the 
mold of the early Church in a procrustean manner.
The difference arose from what was to constitute a
1 7thing indifferent,
Adiaphorism among English reformers came from 
varied sources. For Thomas Starkey and later Richard 
Hooker, the legal tradition within Aristotelianism was 
the starting point, for Ridley and Whitgift, Augus­
tine. Erasmian humanism and Henrician political
18necessity were significant factors. Whatever source, 
adiaphorism took its bearings from Scripture, as 
the Bishop's Book of 1537 maintained: "The greatest
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part of these rules or canons consisteth only in. . .
such things as be of themselves but mean and indif­
ferent things (that is to say, neither commanded 
expressly in Scripture, nor necessary contained or 
implied therein, nor yet expressly repugnant or con­
trary thereunto."^  Starkey believed that Church 
ceremonies, the "rites, customs and traditions of 
fathers, having no ground but only by prescription 
of time" were open to change because scripture said 
nothing of them, leaving them "to world policy. . .
as time and place requireth." Customs could well have 
been of good use at one time and then have decayed to 
the point of necessary abolition. They were valid 
if not positively forbidden in Scripture and were of 
good u s e . 20 Adiaphorism for Starkey was thus based 
on the distinction between the immutable natural 
or divine law and the mutability and changeability
O 1
of human institutions and law.
The concept of adiaphora and the notions con^ 
cerning the primitive church were both important 
contributions to the historical slant of the English 
Reformation, and were also important to the develop­
ment of the idea of progress. Adiaphora included 
ceremonies, institutions, polity, all of which were 
open to historical investigation and which could be
35.
viewed within the context of their origin. In investi­
gating the origin of adiaphora, the history of the 
primitive church was necessarily involved, and thus 
the two were intimately related in Anglican apolo­
getics. 22 The principle was useful to defenders of 
the Via Media, as noted above, who wanted to be part 
of the universal Catholic Church, yet had to stress 
the historical diversity within Christendom in the 
interest of their English church.23 in his contro­
versy with the Roman Catholic opponents of the English 
church, John Jewel (1522-71) built on the foundation of patris­
tic scholarship laid by Thomas Cranmer while empha­
sizing more clearly the distinction between those 
institutions that were human in origin and thus sub­
ject to historical investigation, and matters of 
faith, which were beyond scrutiny,24 Jewel acknow­
ledged that though Scripture is the basis of truth, 
not all truth was contained within it, only the es­
sentials of salvation. Thus "the way is left open 
for the development of those things not essential 
for salvation."25 Jewel wrote
At the last, ye conclude, that it were an 
errour to say, we are bounde of necessity 
to followe the use of the Primitive churche.
To make you a full and cleare answere 
hereunto, I must nedes use this distinction,
There were sum orders in the Primitive 
church coramaunded by God, and sum other 
were devised by men, for the better trayning 
of the people. Such orders as were com- 
maunded by God, may not be changed in any
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case, only because God commaunded them. 
For as God is everlasting so is his worde 
and commaundement everlasting.
The similarity to arguments for the inviolability 
of natural law is obvious; the terms are different, 
but the approach is the same.
After setting forth what is immutable in church 
law, Jewel turns to that which can be altered if 
necessary.
Of the other syde, sutche orders as have 
been devysed by men may be broken, upon 
sum consideration, onelye because they 
were men that devysed them. For as men 
themselves be mortall, so all theyr 
wisedomes and inventiones be but mortall.
As that the communyon should be used in 
the mornynge, or at nyght. That women should 
come to the church either covered or open 
faced, wherin ye say S. Peter toke order.
That the ministers goods shoulde be all 
in common, or otherwyse, & c. These and 
other lyke were thynges appointed and or­
dered by men, and therfore were never used 
in all places of one sorte. But as they 
were brought in by men, so myghte they be 
dissolved and broken by men. In these 
thynges, I graunte, the exaumples of the 
doctoores, or Apostles, bynde us not.
In these thynges it were an erroure to 
say we are bound of necessitie to follow 
the use of the Primitive church. . . .^6
Jewel was the last of the major apologists to 
combat the Roman Catholics over the Via Media. By 
the 1570’s a new opponent arose to challenge the 
established church, the Puritan party. The Puritans 
took much the same attitude towards the past that
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Tyndale, Barnes, Bale and Foxe took, and were bent 
on a restitution of the primitive church, purging 
it of all "popish" characteristics. The chief Angli­
can apologist of this period prior to Richard Hooker, 
John Whitgift, was less able to rely on historical
arguments than was Jewel because he had to meet the
7 7Puritans on biblical grounds. Whitgiftfs approach 
continued in the use of the adiaphoristic principle, 
distinguishing between the visible or external govern­
ment of the Church and the invisible or spiritual.
2 8The former he held to consist of things indifferent. 
Whitgift, in contrast to his opponents, saw flux in 
the early Church and subsequent adaptation to changing 
circumstances as time passed.^9 He allowed that Church 
government, as a human institution, is open to change 
and development.
That any one kind of government is so neces­
sary that without it the church cannot be 
saved, or that it may not be altered into 
some other kind thought to be more expedi­
ent, I utterly deny. . . .  I find no 
one certain and perfect government pre­
scribed or commanded in the scriptures to 
the church of Christ; which no doubt should 
have been done, if it had been a matter 
necessary unto the salvation of the church 
. . .Some kind of government may be a part 
of the church, touching the outward form 
and perfection of it, yet it is not such 
a part of the essence and being, but that 
it may be the Church of Christ without this 
or that kind of government; and therefore 
the kind of government of the church is 
not 'necessary unto salvation'. . . . ^ 0
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Whitgift saw development not only in church govern­
ment, but even in Scripture. He felt that there was 
a progression from the Old to New Testament, with the
O 1
New transcending the Old. x In his Defence of the 
Answer (157 4), he maintained that "there is no one certain 
kind of government in the church which must of neces-
-3 O
sity be perpetually observed." Whitgift thought 
it would be with "preposterous zeal" were the Church 
to slavishly imitate the Apostles because time, cir­
cumstance and place were all different and thus there
was a possibility that change and development would 
33occur,
That change and development were likely to occur 
and were variable according to place, circumstance 
and time is an idea that recurs throughout Whitgift's 
work. It is not unrestricted, though, for he lodges 
in the Church authority to direct the change that will 
come; "Scripture hath left many things to the discretion 
of the church. . , #»34 Hj_s primary concern was to 
demonstrate that Scripture allowed for such offices 
as had developed since the Apostolic age to exist, but 
Whitgift also paused to reflect on the mutability 
of laws of a more general character. There were, in 
his view (and in this he reflected the possible influ­
ence of Thomas Starkey), various gradations of laws.
Some general, and given to all; other personal, 
and pertain only to one singular person, or
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to one nation and kind of people. . .some 
which are perpetual, and not to be omitted 
or altered; other which are temporal, and 
may be omitted or altered, as the circum­
stance of time, place, and persons doth 
require. ^ 5
To those who would maintain that mutability does not 
extend to laws governing Church institutions, Whitgift 
responded:
But I say that in the whole Scripture there 
is no commandment that it should so be nor 
any example that maketh therein any neces­
sary or general rule but that it may be 
altered as time and occation serveth. . . . ^ 6
1 jM^Jay be altered as time and occation serveth. , . . " ;
"may be ommitted or altered, as the circumstance of 
time, place, and persons doth require"--these are lines 
of a refrain that is sounded throughout his work. 
Whitgift does not envision that this alteration is 
inevitable, but neither does he hold that all change 
since the Apostles is but decay, as early English 
Protestants and zealous Puritans believed. Whitgift 
clearly believes that there is room for positive, 
constructive change.
It was with the matter of church government, as 
noted above, that Whitgift was most concerned, and it 
is there that the idea of progress is most evident.
He lashed out constantly against what he perceived 
as a slavish adherence to Scripture:
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That no ceremony, order, discipline, or 
kind of government may be in the church 
except the same be expressed in the Word 
of God is a great absurdity and breedeth
many inconveniences.37
Whitgift does not go so far as to denigrate the impor­
tance of Scripture as a guide, nor does he maintain 
that anything in contravention of Scripture is legiti­
mate, an error he would with the Puritans accuse Rome 
of committing. But he does believe that which is not 
in conflict with Scripture is at the Church's discretion 
to maintain or change.
We are also well assured that Christ in 
his Word hath fully and plainly compre­
hended all things requisite to faith and 
good life; but yet hath he committed cer­
tain orders of ceremonies and kind of 
government to the disposition of his 
church, the general rules given in his 
Word being observed and nothing being done 
contrary to his will and commandment 
therin contained. . . .38
An aspect of Church government Whitgift believes 
subject to alteration is that of offices. As all 
offices "are not necessarry for all times of the 
church," so others"may be brought in meet for the
1 Qgovernment of the same." Such things as titles 
were matters of indifference to Scripture, Whitgift 
maintained, as in the case of archbishop.
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The authority and the thing whereof the 
archbishop hath his name was in Paul's 
time, and therefore the name was lawful; 
and if it had not been in St. Paul's time, 
yet were both the name and the office law­
ful because it pertaineth to the external 
policy and regiment of the church, which 
is variable according to the place, time, 
person, and other circumstances.^
Whitgift resorted to exegesis at times in an effort to 
challenge that of his Puritan foes;
I pray you what meant St. Paul in I Cor. 
xiv, after he had prescribed certain orders 
unto them to be observed in the church, 
thus generally to conclude. . .'Let all
things be done decently and in order'?
Doth he not there give unto them authority 
to make orders in the church so that all 
things be done in order and decently? The 
best interpreters do understand this as a 
general rule given unto the church to 
examine her traditions and constitutions 
by; and therefore without all doubt their 
judgment is that the church hath authority 
in external things to make orders and ap­
point laws, not expressed in the Word of 
God, so that this rule of the apostle be 
observed.41
Whitgift insisted that there be room for growth and 
development in church government, and that his position 
had the warrant of the Apostles and of Christ,
As for names and titles and other external 
things variable according to divers circum­
stances, he (christj hath left them to the 
liberty of his church. . .which is one part 
of his singular goodness towards the church 
in that it is not so servilely tied to ex­
ternal things and to the letter as it was 
under the l a w .
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It is clear from his work that Whitgift was a 
proponent of the importance of change in church govern­
ment. He believed that church institutions were sub­
ject to place and time, and could be changed to meet 
changing circumstances, and in fact should be. These 
concepts are integral to the development of the idea of 
progress, and it is clear from what has been shown above 
that Whitgift was not uncongenial to that idea as it 
had developed up to his time. Yet he went only a 
small way down the path that led to the growth of the 
idea of progress. While he held institutions were open 
to change, he did not believe doctrine changed, and he 
certainly did not believe human nature was subject to 
improvement this side of the Second Coming of our Lord 
Jesus Christ. In this regard he was somewhat at odds 
with Vives and Starkey, as well as Erasmus. It was 
left to Richard Hooker to draw on the thought of both 
groups and unite them into the strongest expression of 
the idea of progress in the sixteenth-century.
CHAPTER III
RICHARD HOOKER AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
Richard Hooker, the "judicious" Hooker, was 
one of the most esteemed of ecclesiastics produced 
by the established church in the England of Eliza­
beth. He was in many ways the finest apologist for 
the Via Media and was almost certainly the most philo­
sophical, a fact evident to anyone with even a passing 
familiarity of his Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical 
Polity. His work is the summation of fifty years 
of labor by his predecessors, a systematization of 
what had until then been a disparate collection of 
arguments some fruitful and some leading to blind 
alleys. It is in Hooker, therefore, that we find 
the fullest expression of the idea of progress as it 
had unfolded in the sixteenth century. Hooker, in 
drawing together his defense of the established church, 
implicitly developed the idea of progress to its 
greatest extent prior to the mid-seventeenth century.
In doing so, he drew on the work of humanists like 
Vives and Starkey, and the historical insights of his 
mentors Jewel and Whitgift,
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Hooker displayed his humanist temperament in
his optimistic view of man's perfectibility, at least
man's potential for perfection. He believed that
"everything naturally and necessarily doth desire
the utmost good and greatest perfection, whereof
nature hath made it capable, even so man." This
being the case, humans "cannot choose but wish and
covet it."-*- Hooker believed that a gradual perfection
was in the nature of things: "All. . .things besides
are somewhat in possibilitie, which as yet they are
not in act." He continues: "And for this cause there
is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they
inclyne to something which they may be: and when they
2
are it, they shall be perfecter then nowe they are."
This progress to perfection he divides into degrees, 
the first being "that generall perfection which all 
thinges doe seeke, in desiring the continuance of 
their being," The second degree "is that which each 
thing coveteth by affecting resemblaunce with God, 
in the constancie and excellencie of those operations 
which belong to their kinde," Hooker saw God as the 
end of all human progression towards perfection, and 
quotes Aristotle to the effect that "'the workes of 
nature do alwayes ayme at that which cannot be bettered.
The means by which man grows in perfection Hooker 
believed to be knowledge, and here again he shows 
his humanist background, "With Plato what one
thing more usuall, then to excite men unto the love 
of wisdome, by showing how much wise men are thereby 
exalted above men; how knowledge doth rayse them up 
into heaven; how it maketh them, though not Gods, yet 
as gods, high, admirable and divine?"^ In his argu­
ment for the possibility of purposeful change, Hooker 
advanced a theory of the progressive development of 
human knowledge and thus the perfectibility of man, 
one of the cardinal features of the modern idea of 
progress. He looked to reason as a supplement to 
divine revelation; it was for the purpose of dis­
covering law, among other things, that God gave man 
reason.^
Hooker believed all beings to have a tendency 
to pursue the good, yet the "soule of man therefore 
being capable of a more divine perfection, hath (be­
sides the faculties of growing unto sensible knowledge 
which is common unto us with beasts) a further lia­
bility, whereof in them there is no show at all, the 
abilitie of reaching higher then unto sensible things. 
It is a long, slow process by which men rise upward 
in knowledge, for "men if wee view them in their 
spring, are at first without understanding or knowledg 
at all." Knowledge comes by degrees, and in time 
men will "come at length to be even as the Angels 
themselves," Hooker argued, much as John Locke would 
later, that "the soule of man" is "at the first as a
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booke, wherein nothing is, and yet all thinges may 
be imprinted;" it is our duty "to search by what 
steppes and degrees it ryseth unto the perfection 
of knowledge."^
For a time, men ascertain nothing, and until 
"we grow to some ripeness of years," the progress 
in man's knowledge is not apparent. During that 
time the "soule of man doth only store it selfe with 
the conceipts of things of inferiour and more open 
qualitie" and it is these that later "serve as instru­
ments unto that which is greater," Until such time, 
men rise not above the level of animals. However,
"once it comprehendeth anything above this, as the 
differences of time, affirmations, negations, and 
contradictions in speech; we then count it to have some 
use of natural reason."^ The importance of reason 
in Hooker's Lawes cannot be overstated, especially 
in regard to his notion of progress. It is reason 
which, as will be pointed out below, enables man to 
discern good laws from bad and to improve his state 
in the world through better laws; it is also through 
reason that man devised the mechanical arts that 
enabled him to make his physical existence a little 
better. But it must again be acknowledged that Hooker 
believed man to use his reason to advance or progress 
in the world only within the bounds laid down by 
God's divine immutable law. In this respect Hooker
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differs from the modern proponents of progress, for 
they have by and large banished God from His creation 
and from any role in man's progress in the world.
Hooker did not, however, perceive God as intervening 
in His creation, and is not as "primitive" as the 
moderns might think.
Hooker acknowledged the strong possibility that 
the progress he identified in man's development, in 
his ascent from his primitive beginnings, will con­
tinue into the future: "Whereunto if afterwardes there 
might be added the right helpes of true art and learning 
(which helpes I must plainely confesse this age of 
the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth 
neyther much know nor greatly regard) there would 
undoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturitie 
of judgement betweene men therewith inured, and that 
which now men are, as betweene men that are now and
Q
innocents." The parallel between this sentiment and
*
that expressed by Vives is striking, and Hooker's 
barb cast at his own time does not obscure the fact 
that he saw room for unlimited growth in knowledge.
For those who doubt, he responds in advance:
Which speech if any condemne as being over 
hyperbolicall, let them consider but this 
one thing. No art is at the first finding 
out so perfect as industrie may after make 
it. Yet the very first man that to any 
purpose knew the way we speake of and fol-
See above, p. 15.
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lowed it, hath alone thereby performed more 
very neede in all partes of naturall know­
ledge, then sithence in any one part thereof, 
the whole world besides hath doone.
Admittedly there is not here an unqualified, unequivocal
statement that progress will continue inexorably
/
into the future. Man must after all work toward that 
end and he must exert effort to achieve the goal towards 
which he strives. Above all, Hooker maintains that 
"whatsoever we have hitherto taught, or shall here­
after, concerning the force of mans naturall under­
standing f this we always desire withall to be under­
stood, that there is* no kind of faculty or power in 
man or any other creature, which can rightly performe 
the functions alloted to it, without perpetuall aid 
and concurrence of that supreme cause of all things. 
Hooker never left any doubt that throughout history, 
the Hand of God "disposed of what man proposed,
Man's drive to higher things found its most im­
mediate manifestation in the origins of society.
Hooker firmly believed that government was a necessary 
and positive development that came as a result of the 
Fall. In the strife and conflict that resulted after 
that calamitous event, men reasoned that "by growing 
unto composition and agreement amongst themselves, 
by ordeining some kind of government publike, and 
by yeelding themselves subject" to leaders "unto whom 
they graunted authoritie to rule and governe," they
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might be able to secure "the peace, tranquilitie, and 
happy estate" necessary for a civilized society.
It was not only for civil order that Hooker thought 
men developed forms of society, but also for survival, 
"for as much as we are not by our selves sufficient 
to furnish ourselves with competent store of things 
needfull for such a life as our nature doth desire, 
a life fit for the dignitie of man: therefore to 
supply those defects and imperfections, which are in 
us living, single, and solie by our selves, we are 
naturally induced to seeke communion and fellowship 
with others. This was the cause of mens uniting 
themselves at the first in politique societies. . . ." ^
After having secured life and the means whereby to 
support it, Hooker theorized that men then turned 
to the development of religion. "True it is," he 
wrote, "that the kingdome of God must be the first 
thing in our purposes and desires." Nevertheless,
"in as much as righteous life presupposeth life, in 
as much as to live virtuously it is impossible except 
we live, therefore the first impediment, which naturally 
we endeavor to remove, is penurie and want of things 
without which we cannot live." This led men to dis­
cover and develop "sundry artes mechanical" in "the 
verie prime of the world," thus supplying the "many 
implements. . .necessarie" for "such a life as hath 
in it joy, comfort, delight and p l e a s u r e . " - ^
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In this manner, Hooker traced the development 
of the necessary elements of human society, illus­
trating the progression of man from his primitive 
state to a more civilized state, and setting the stage 
for the next development in his argument. Once society 
had developed, Hooker thought it folly to return to 
some mythical golden age of man in his pure and natural 
state, because that which is natural is not perfect. 
Since man is, as a result of the Fall, not naturally 
good, it would be absurd to return to a state of 
nature and renounce all development of society.
"We all make complaint of the iniquitie of our times" 
he wrote; "for the days are evill." Yet he called 
upon the men of his time to observe their own days 
and "compare them with those times, wherein there were 
no civill societies, with those times wherein there 
was as yet no maner of publique regiment established," 
former barbarous and lawless times; "and we have 
surely good cause to thinke that God hath blessed 
us exceedingly, and Hath made us behold most happie 
daies."-^ Hooker did not stop there, satisfied that 
contemporary society was good enough and should remain 
static; with Aristotle he perceived that man, being 
a creative agent, would express this nature in his 
civilization. Thus, as civilization changed, so would 
the form of government change to accommodate new de^ 
velopments.18
Hooker argued that all things human were open 
to change; "God never ordeyned any thing that could 
be bettered." Nevertheless, "many things He hath 
that have been chaunged, and that for the better."
And when changed, that "which succeedeth as better 
now when change is requisite, had bene worse when 
that which now is chaunged was instituted." If this 
were not so, then God would leave no room for choice 
unless there were "some new growne occasion making 
that which hath bene better worse;" in such a situation 
"men doe not presume to chaunge Gods ordinance, but 
they yeelde thereunto requiring it selfe to be chaunged." 
In the universe described by Hooker in his Lawes there 
is room for growth, improvement and change.
While Hooker's sense of history led him to find 
the roots of everything in the historic past, he "looked 
forward also to developments that might still take 
place."20 This possibility of purposeful, progressive 
change directed by man found clear expression in 
Hooker's discussion of laws and in man's ability 
to develop them, Npt all law was subject to change.
A distinction was drawn between natural and positive 
law; the former is identified with God's law, which 
"is eternall, and therefore can have no shew or cullor 
of mutabilitie,"2^ Positive law, however, is subject 
to alteration: "Positive lawes are either permanent 
or else changeable, according as the matter it selfe
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2 2is concerning which they were first made.1 Hooker
argued that the "wisdome which is learned by tract
of time, findeth the lawes that have bene in former
ages establisht, needfull in later to be abrogated,"
for in truth, "that which sometime is expedient doth
2 2not alwaies so continue." The necessity that men 
of past ages have found which requires them to alter 
laws in response to changing circumstances was a major 
theme in Hooker's argument for the mutability of human 
law. Human laws legislated in past ages always become 
outdated because they do "not allow continuous appli­
cation to new situations."24 He allowed that at "first 
when some certaine kinde of regiment was once approved," 
those framing the laws saw no use of their being changed 
at the time. It was not until "by experience they 
found this for all parts verie inconvenient," and thus 
realized "to live by one m a n ’s will became the cause 
of all men's misery,"25 He thus argued that men should 
not be bound to follow the laws of previous ages if 
they are found to be burdensome.
Hooker did not argue for one moment that each 
new age should rewrite all the laws of former times, 
but he consistently emphasizes their necessary muta­
bility. If laws are not to be abolished, they never­
theless are often in need of adjustment: "The end 
wherefore lawes were made may bee permanent," but 
"those lawes neverthelesse require some alteration,
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if there bee any unfitness in the meanes which they 
prescribe as tending unto that end and purpose."
This is so because some things that necessitate certain 
laws are unfortunately always with us. For example,
"a law that to bridle theft doth punish theves with 
a quadruple restitution hath an end which wil con­
tinue as long as the world it self contineuth," for 
"theft will alwaies and will alwaies neede to be 
bridled." But "no man can warrant" that such a law 
will always be sufficient, for "that which hath bene 
once most sufficient, may wax otherwise by alteration 
of time and place, that punishment which hath bene 
sometimes forcible to bridle sinne may growe afterwardes 
too weake and feeble."26 Hooker did admit that some 
laws are not of the type that are in need of continual 
adjustment; "If therefore the end for which a lawe 
provideth be perpetually necessary, and the way whereby 
it provideth be perpetually necessary, and the way 
whereby it provideth perpetually also most apt, no 
doubt but that every such lawe ought for ever to 
remaine u n c h a n g e a b l e ."27 He concluded that any change 
undertaken should be done with the utmost care, and 
not be arbitrary, "for arbitrarie alterations, when 
lawes in them selves not simply bad or unmeete are 
changed for better and more expedient; if the benefit 
of that which is newly better devised bee but small, 
sith the custome of easiness to alter and change is
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so evill, no doubt but to beare a tollerable soare 
is better then to venter on a daungerous r e m e d i e . " 2 8
Hooker consistently allowed for the possibility 
of progressive change in human law, a progress which 
should necessarily take place over an extended period 
of time; it should be the slow, considered adjustment 
of human laws to meet the changing needs of society. 
Hooker conceived of all laws in terms of historical 
convenience and development. The aim of Hooker's 
system of laws was to "determine the comparative in­
dependence, with regard to the fundamental principles 
of Christianity, of human legislation, and to show 
that it is by its nature subject to change and capable
of progressive transformation."29
As we have seen, the idea of progress can be dis­
cerned in an embryonic form in Hooker's discussions 
of man's perfectibility and of the mutability and 
progressive change in laws of society. Yet this 
notion of progress was not confined strictly to civil 
law; Hooker after all wrote on ecclesiastical polity, 
and in fact he shows that matters of church law are 
subject to progressive improvement.
Hooker believed that matters of polity were sub­
ject to change, and he posited that the authority to 
direct such change as may be needed lay with the 
church; "The Church hath authoritie to establish 
that for an order at one tyme, which at an other 
time it maie abolish, and in both doe well." Such
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change was confined strictly to polity, though: "Lawes 
touchinge matter of order are changeable, by the 
power of the Church; articles concerninge doctrine 
not so."2° One of the chief reasons for the necessity 
of change was the incompleteness, in matters of polity, 
of the works of the Apostles.
Is it necessary that all the orders of the 
Church which were then in use should be 
contained in their books? Surely no. For 
if the tenor of their writinges be well 
observed, it shall unto any man easily 
appeare, that no more of them are there 
touched, then were needfull to be spoken 
of sometimes by one occasion, and some­
times by another.21
The idea that laws are subject to adjustment as circum­
stances change is important to Hooker, as it was to 
Whitgift.
Hooker attacks the notion put forward by his 
opponents that the rites and ceremonies of the early 
church were perfect, and those of his day, as they 
believed, having "in many thinges. . .departed from 
the auncient simplicitie of Christ and his Apostles," 
were therefore imperfect. Granting that "the first 
state of thinges was best, that in the prime of Christian 
Religion faith was soundest, the scriptures of God 
were then best understood by all men" it follows 
"that customes lawes and ordinances devised since are 
not so good for the Church of Christ, but the best
way is to cut of later inventions, and to reduce 
things unto the auncient state wherin at the first 
they were." In the face of such an argument, Hooker 
begged to differ: "Which rule or canon we hold to be 
either uncertaine or at least wise unsufficient; if 
not both." He asks "what reason is there in these 
thinges to urge the state of one onely age, as a 
patterne for all to follow?" The arguments of his 
opponents he reduces to the absurd; must Christians 
"assemble. . .to serve God in close and secret meetings 
or must "common brookes and rivers. . .be used for 
places of baptisme" because this was the practice 
of the early church? Hooker readily admits that 
the "faith zeale and godlines of former times is 
worthylie had in high honour." Yet this should not 
bind future generations to strictly practice their 
religion within the narrow confines of the early 
church.22
Hooker accorded a high position to scripture, 
writing that "all those writings which conteine in 
them the lawe of God, all those venerable bookes of 
scripture, all those sacred tomes and volumes of 
holie writ, they are with such absolute perfection 
framed, that in them there neither wanteth any thing, 
the lacke whereof might deprive us of life; nor any 
thing in such aboundeth, that as being superfluous, 
unfruitfull, and altogether needlesse, wee should
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thinke it no losse or daunger at all if we did not 
want it."24 Yet for all that, he believed that there 
was room for doctrinal development of concepts found 
within scripture. He distinguishes between the notion 
that a doctrine or institution must be contained 
within scripture and the idea that it need only be 
comprehended within scripture; the latter concept, 
which he favored, allows for growth of development 
based on the original text. "Against the former of 
these two constructions, instance hath sundrie wayes 
bene geven" as in the case of "our beliefe in the 
Trinitie, the Coeternitie of the Sonne of God with his 
Father, the proceeding of the Spirit from the Father 
and the Sonne, the dutie of baptizing infants, these 
with such other principall points, the necessitie 
wherof is by none denied, are notwithstanding in scrip­
ture no where to be found by expresse literall mention, 
only deduced they are out of scripture by collection." 
Hooker questions how long this process of deducing 
principles from scripture, this process of progressive 
development of doctrine will continue, and concludes 
that we must "not thinke that as long as the world 
doth indure, the wit of man shal be able to sound 
the bottome of that which may be concluded out of the 
scripture, especially if things conteined by collection 
do so far extend, as to draw in whatsoever may be at 
any time out of scripture but probablie and conjecural-
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lie surmised."25
It is, however, primarily in the matter of church 
laws and institutions that Hooker gives evidence of 
the idea of progress. Scripture contains several of 
the most important and basic laws pertaining to the 
church, a point that is readily conceded. There are, 
though, "a number of things. . .for which the scripture 
hath not provided by any law, but left them unto the 
carefull discretion of the Church; we are to search 
how the Church in these cases may be well directed 
to make that provision by lawes which is most convenient 
and fit." How this is to be done "partly scripture 
and partly reason must teach to discerne."26 There 
are some things to which the "Church is bound till 
the worldes ende." The question then "is onely how 
farre the bounds of the Churches libertie do reach." 
Hooker believed "that the power which the Church hath 
lawfully to make lawes and orders for it selfe, doth 
extende unto sundrie thinges of ecclesiasticall juris­
diction and other such matters."27
Among the laws susceptible to change Hooker in­
cluded "onely such lawes as are positive, and doe make 
that now good or evill by being commanded or forbidden, 
which otherwise of it selfe were not simply the one 
or the other." If there is no indication of how long 
such laws are to continue in force (as might be sup­
posed in the case of certain ceremonial laws in the Old
Testament which were in force until Christ fulfilled 
them), "then have we no light to direct our judgmentes 
concerning the chaungeableness or immutabilitie of them, 
but by considering the nature and qualitie of such lawes 
Hooker believed it the "nature of everie lawe" to 
be "judged of by the ende for which it was made, and 
by the aptnes of thinges therein prescribed unto the 
same end."28 He maintained that "lawes though both 
ordeyned of God himselfe, and the end for which they 
were ordeined continuing, may notwithstanding cease, 
if by alteration of persons or times they be found 
unsufficient to attain unto that end," The question 
then becomes in "which respect why may we not presume 
that God doth even call for such change or alteration, 
as the very condition of thinges them selves doth make 
necessary?"29
Hooker continually emphasizes that he is not 
advocating the alteration of doctrine (although as 
we have seen above he did believe there to be room 
for progressive development, an unfolding of Revelation) 
and quotes Tertullian: "The rule of faith, saith
Tertullian, is but one and that alone immoveable, and 
impossible to be framed or cast anew." He insists, 
though, that with the "lawe of outwarde order and 
politie" it is not so. "There is no reason in the 
world wherefore we should esteeme it as necessarie 
alwaies to doe, as alwaies to believe the same things;
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seing every man knoweth that the matter of faith is 
constant, the matter contrariwise of action daily 
changeable, especially the matter of action belonging 
unto Church politie," He repeats that "articles 
of beliefe, and thinges which all men must of neces- 
sitie doe to the end they may be saved, are eyther 
set downe in scripture, or els plainely therby to be 
gathered." But for the governance of the church 
laws can be made "which kinde of lawes (for as much 
as they are not in them selves necessary to salvation) 
may after they are made be also changed as the dif­
ference of times or places shall r e q u i r e . "4° He con­
sistently maintains throughout his work "thet nether 
Gods being author of laws for government of his Church, 
nor his committing them unto scripture, is any reason 
sufficient wherefore all Churches shoulde for ever 
be bounde to keep them without c h a u n g e . " ^ !
In all, Hooker shows himself the heir of John 
Whitgift and beyond him Thomas Starkey in matters of 
church polity, and of Starkey and Juan Vives in regards 
to his discussion of society and the perfectibility 
of man. At no point did he come forth with an explicit 
statement of the idea of progress. Yet as we have 
seen, much of his argument in the Of the Lawes of 
Ecclesiasticall Polity involved an implicit assumption 
of human progress. Hooker saw in the creation of 
better institutions, as well as better laws, the
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steady growth of society. He did not believe that 
a society should remain static, and he consistently 
urged the idea that human institutions were open to 
change and improvement; only Divine Law was above 
alteration. His Lawes established Hooker not only 
as the outstanding apologist for the Via Media in the 
sixteenth century, but also as one of the greatest 
of Elizabethan philosophers. He stood on the threshold 
of the modern world, and his development of an idea 
of progress could well be thought to place him beyond 
"the watershed that seperates medieval from modern.
EPILOGUE
Hooker was, in the matter of the idea of pro­
gress, the heir and finisher of a stream of thought 
that can be found in Vives and Starkey on the one 
hand, and in Whitgift on the other. To what extent 
he was influenced by continental thought is open 
to conjecture, but the issue of Hooker's relation­
ship to sixteenth century historical thought, in 
particular to how historians of that time viewed 
history as unfolding, cannot be overlooked.
The sixteenth century was, after all, the age 
in which the modern historical consciousness was 
born.-*- There were basically two schools of his­
torical thought, the Italian and the French, Renais­
sance humanists in Italy wrought a "reorientation 
in thought"— they were more concerned with "gaining 
access to the past" than with "how to make use of 
it." No longer could they avoid the fact of his- 
torical change. They revived an interest m  his­
torians like Livy, Cicero, and Polybius, and they 
dealt with the past in realistic terms, with atten­
tion given to the particular and individual, and not 
in abstractions. They also contributed to historical 
thought an antiquarian interest and veneration for
antiquity. For all this, they remained in the thrall
62.
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of the ancient historians, whom they imitated and
3
believed could not be bettered.
The Italians looked upon history as political 
history, largely of contemporary subjects, which was 
used to instruct by example, but they drew from their 
study no idea of progression in the human past. For 
them, change was explained by the periodization "golden 
age--dark age— renaissance," in which history had no 
goal.^ With the invasions of Italy that began in 1494, 
Italian historians moved away from the writing of 
civic histories extolling the virtues of a given city 
and began to address issues of causation. In Florence 
in particular there arose an approach concerned with 
the analysis of government and the fate of states, 
especially in the work of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) 
and Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540). Both sought 
to explain history in terms of laws that controlled 
the change in human affairs. Machiavelli saw history 
as an interplay between the action of humans and 
human subjection to uncontrollable forces, or neces- 
sita. In both Machiavelli and Guicciardini Fate or 
Fortune was the ultimate moving force m  history.
There is thus no progress in history, only cycles in 
which governments go from principality to tyranny to 
democracy to anarchy and back to the rule of princes.
The French school of historiography was, in
7
respect of the idea of progress, much more fruitful. 
Their approach developed out of an interest in the
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development of legal institutions unlike the Italians
o
and their concern with politics. In fact, they
developed a secularized version of universal history,
and included the whole course of the human past with-
9
in their broad sweep. It is m  the work of Jean 
Bodin (c. 1530-96) that this school of historical 
thought finds its ablest and most forceful exponent.
In his Method of Understanding History (1566) Bodin 
outlines his theory of how history unfolded. He 
attacks the notion of a golden age in man's past from 
which all subsequent history is a tale of decline, 
scoffing that it was the illusion "of men carried 
out of port into the open sea--they think the houses 
and towns are department from them; thus they think 
that delight, gentle conduct, and justice have flown 
to the heavens and deserted the e a r t h . " L i k e  Vives 
before him he gives honor to the ancients for their 
accomplishments, but feels "they left incomplete many 
of those things which have been completed and handed 
down to posterity by men of our own time. . . . "
Bodin cites the magnet and navigation (and the con^ 
sequent discovery of the new world), geography, medi­
cine, all developed by men of his age, and above all 
printing, which "alone can easily vie with all the 
discoveries of the ancients," as proof that there 
had been progress in human history.
Hooker must certainly have imbibed the thought of 
his age, and these currents sketched above were likely
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taken in by his searching intellect. In so far as 
he viewed the church as an historical institution 
that has developed and grown through time he showed 
his historical sense. Yet in so far as he shows any 
direct influence of historical thinking it is the 
influence of Whitgift and the Via Media approach, not 
continental thought, that is strongest. The Italian 
idea of history as an endless succession of cycles 
found no place in his schema, and as a Christian he 
would reject the notion of fate as the controlling 
force in history.^ His relationship to the French 
legal school of historical thought would seem much 
stronger, though he makes no explicit reference to 
it; certainly he must have been aware of the work of 
Bodin. For Hooker, the idea of progress as he gave 
expression to it, was an interpretation in abstract 
terms of how history unfolded, but it ironically 
arose not out of history per se, but out of a theory 
of man and of human institutions.
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